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Religion and Migration in Northeast Asia1
Gracia Liu-Farrer
When people move across borders, so do their gods. Changing dynamics of global migration are
creating new religious frontiers. China, Korea and Japan, the three economic powerhouses in
Northeast Asia, are witnessing both the expansion of immigration and increasingly complex religious
landscapes. Yet, research on the intersection of religion and contemporary migration in this region
is almost non-existent. Extrapolating from an ethnographic study in a Chinese immigrant congrega-
tion in Tokyo, this paper outlines some patterns of relationship between religion and migration in
Northeast Asia. First, it shows that both migration and religion rely heavily on social network ties,
and these social ties often both facilitate migration as well as spread religious beliefs. The nature of
immigrant life tends to turn religious congregations into ethnic community centers and social
services providers. Second, migration makes religion more salient in immigrants’ lives. Migrants
tend to impact their home region’s religious practices by bringing in newly acquired religious
knowledge, and channeling in religious resources by helping build transnational religious networks.
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Countries in Northeast Asia have had strong religious inﬂuence on each other
throughout history. Buddhism and Confucianism, together with native religions such
as Daoism (China), Shamanism (Korea) and Shinto (Japan), dominated much of this
region’s religious and political history. Christianity entered China and Japan in the late
16th century and spread from China to Korea in the 17th century (Kwon, Kim and
Warner 2001). The past two centuries witnessed its fast expansion in the Korean
Peninsula. Starting from the late 20th century, it has also become the fastest growing
religion in mainland China (Chan 2006). At present, both native and adopted religions
have attracted large numbers of followers in this region.
Northeast Asia has also sent out millions of emigrants who have now formed large
ethnic communities around the world. Overseas Chinese, Japanese and Koreans are
among the most prosperous and entrepreneurial ethnic communities in North America,
Southeast Asia and increasingly Oceania and Europe, as well. In recent decades, Japan,
Korea and China have transformed from emigrant countries to immigrant countries.
Large numbers of migrants from all over the worldskilled and unskilled, documented
and undocumentedstarted entering Japan in the 1980s, Korea in the 1990s, and more
recently, China. Moreover, despite historical grudges and territorial disputes, there has
been a conscious e#ort to create a form of economic and cultural integration in this
region. Therefore, these countries have seen increasing numbers of migrants from each
other. The Chinese are the biggest foreign resident population in both Japan and Korea,
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while Koreans and Japanese make up the largest foreign student populations in China
and among the biggest expat communities in big cities such as Shanghai.
Although the Northeast Asian region has fast-growing religious populations and
sees increasing immigration, very little research has been done on the intersection of
religion and contemporary migration in this region. This paper attempts to lay out
some patterns of relationship between religion and migration in Northeast Asia. Data
on religion and migration are scarce and on the religious beliefs of migrants, nonexist-
ent. My understanding of the role of religion in the migration process and immigrant
life is based on my ﬁeldwork in a Chinese immigrant congregation in Tokyo between
2003 and 2005. Before introducing the relationship between religion and migration, in
the following section, I ﬁrst give a sketch of the religious and migration practices in the
major countries of this regionChina, Korea and Japan.
A Sketch of Religion in Contemporary China, Korea and Japan
Since economic reform in the late 1970s, China has been witnessing a huge revival
of religion. It now has the world’s largest Buddhist population, fast-growing Catholic
and Protestant congregations, expanding Muslim communities and active Daoist tem-
ples (Ashiwa and Wank 2009). The government regulatory agency in China, Informa-
tion O$ce of the State Council, reports that in 1997, there were 100 million religious
believers, including 18 million Muslims, 10 million Protestants and another 4 million
Catholics. It registered 85,000 religious sites including churches, mosques and temples,
300,000 clergy, and 3,000 religious organizations. Among the religious sites, 13,000
were Buddhist temples; 30,000 were Mosques; 4,000 were state sanctioned Catholic
churches; and 12,000 churches and over 25,000 meeting places belonged to the faith of
Protestantism (cited from Ashiwa and Wank 2009). However, the actual number of
religious believers might exceed the o$cial ﬁgure. For example, counting the number
of Bibles printed and distributed by the China Christian Council and brought in from
overseas, uno$cial ﬁgures of Christian believers alone range from 35 million to 80
million (Chan 2006).
In Korea, the two largest religions are Buddhism and Christianity. Both arrived via
China. Buddhism came to Korea in the 4th century and Christianity in the 17th century
(Kwon, Kim and Warner 2001). According to South Korea’s 2005 Census, over half of
the South Korean population was religious. Of the religious population, 29.2 are
Christianincluding 18.3 Protestants and 10.9 Catholics, 22.8 are Buddhists, and
the rest adheres to various new religious movements including Jeungism, Daesunism,
Cheondoism, Taoism, Confucianism and Won Buddhism. A small minority of Koreans
also profess Islam (see Table 1 for the breakdown). Large metropolitan areas had the
highest proportions of people belonging to formal religious groups: 49.9 percent in
Seoul, 46.1 percent in Busan, and 45.8 percent in Daegu. South Korea had the highest
percentage of Christians in East Asia. With over 750,000 members in 2003, the Full
Gospel Church in Seoul, Korea became the largest Protestant congregation in the world
(Chan 2006).
In Japan, Christian communities are less visible than in Korea, with 3 million
followers, consisting of a little over 2 percent of the total population (Shukyo Nenkan
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2009). However, according to the Japan Agency for Cultural A#airs’ annual yearbook
(Shukyo Nenkan 2009), 107 million Japanese people identify themselves as Shinto, 89
million as Buddhist and 3 million as Christian, with 10 million following ”other”
religions. Majority Japanese practice both Shinto and Buddhism simultaneously.
Shinto shrines are the most important public spaces in Japanese urban neighborhoods
and rural communities. Community festivals, ceremonial events and social gatherings
frequently take place in Shinto shrines. Buddhist temples, on the other hand, function
for the passed away. Funerals are commonly hosted in Buddhist temples.
Contemporary Migration in Northeast Asia
Because of the particular social and political contexts in Northeast Asia, the onset of
contemporary migration within and into this region is rather recent. Communist China
did not open its borders to let people in and out relatively freely until the mid-1980s.
South Korea saw large outmigration after World War II and did not start importing
brides, students and labor until recently. Japan, also, was considered a homogeneous
country and even a negative case of immigration among developed countries. Outmi-
gration is still a strong trend in Northeast Asia, especially China. Yet the booming
economy in this region has made these countries increasingly attractive immigration
destinations. In particular, the transnational economy in this region has produced
fast-expanding population movements among each other. For example, the Chinese
make up the largest immigrant population in both Japan and Korea. With geographic
proximity, transnational social space is forming in this region.
Among these three countries, Japan started labor import ﬁrst. The immigrant
population in Japan is relatively small. By 2008, 2.2 million foreigners made up 1.74
percent of the total population.2 The recent history of immigration to Japan began in
the mid-1980s when Japan’s economy was continuously developing while its reserve
domestic labor force was being exhausted due to the low fertility rate and an aging
population. Several doors were opened to allow outsiders to come in. The most
important are the trainee system, the return of ethnic Japanese in Latin America, the
2 Here the foreign population means registered resident aliens instead of the foreign-born population. Many resident aliens
were Koreans with Special Residency Permits who were born in Japan. On the other hand, many naturalized
foreign-born citizens were not counted.








No religion 51 46 45 5 1
Buddhists 25 27 26 2 2
Protestants 16 19 17 3 2
Catholics 5 7 11 2 5
Other 3 1 1 1 0
N (Unweighted) 615,892 592,718 661,685
Note: The table is cited from Kim, J., Lee, Y., Son, J. and Smith, T. W. (2009), Trends of Religious
Identiﬁcation in Korea: Changes and Continuities. Journal for the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion, 48:
789793.
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plan to increase foreign students on Japanese campuses, and the expansion of categories
of possible labor import.
In 1981, the Industrial Training Program for Non-Japanese was established for the
purposes of “international transfer of skills, technology and knowledge,” and “contribu-
tion to the development of human resources, playing a central role in the economic
development of developing countries.” Since 2005, “trainees” have been the single
biggest group of new entrants every year, reaching over 100 thousand in 2008 but
largely invisible to the Japanese public. Bound by contracts, they have designated
tasks, limited mobility, and no legal possibility to settle in Japan. The late 1980s saw the
return of hundreds of thousands of Japanese descendents from South America. The
Nikkei migrantspeople of Japanese descentwere preferred as migrant labor because
they are supposedly ethnic Japanese. They are granted “Long Term Resident (teijusha)”
statuses, and have few legal constraints on their mobility. The majority of Nikkei
migrants take up manual labor in the factories of big Japanese companies and live in
industrial towns in the Tokai area (Kitazawa 1992, Tsuda 1999, 2003). Another
important immigration policy was the decision to accept students. Japan’s Prime
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposed the “Plan to Accept 100,000 Foreign Students
before the Beginning of 21st Century” during his visits to ASEAN countries in 1983. In
2008, the Japanese government approved the plan to recruit 300 thousand international
students by 2020.3 This is a major pattern of migration from China to Japan. Between
1978 and 2008, over 300,000 Chinese entered the Japanese border as either language
students or university students. A large number of them eventually entered the
Japanese labor market and settled in Japan.
As a consequence of these immigration policies, Japan’s foreign population in-
creased drastically in the decades since the mid-1980s. The largest foreign resident
group is Chinese, making up over 30 percent of the total foreign population. The other
four of the top ﬁve foreign national groups are Koreans (27 percent), Brazilians (14
percent), Filipinos (9 percent) and Peruvians (3 percent). In 2009, the biggest group of
foreign residents was permanent residents, making up 40 percent of the total foreign
population. Half of these permanent residents are in the category of special permanent
residents, a label applied to pre-WWII migrants mostly from the Korea Peninsula.
Korea is a traditional migrant sending country. Over 7 million Korean descendants
live overseas. The majority of these overseas Koreans live in China, Japan and the
United States.4 Post-WWII migration brought many skilled Korean laborers and their
families into the United States. The US is still the most attractive destination for
education for Koreans. Korean students ranked number 2 or 3 among all foreign
students in the US. However, in the late 1980s, with Korea’s continuous economic boom
since the 1970s and labor shortage caused by sharply declining fertility, foreign
workers started entering Korea. Aside from legal professional workers and laborers
supplied through trainee programs, the majority of foreign workers work illegally in
Korea (Kim 2004). In 2008, 1,158,866 foreigners had a status of sojourn in Korea (Korea
3 “‘Ryugaku 30 Mannin Keikaku’ Kosshi (The Central Points of ‘the 300 Thousand International Students Plan’),” available
at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2008/07/29kossi.pdf, accessed on August 27, 2009.
4 Statistics are obtained from Ministry of Foreign A#airs and Trade, Republic of Korea, available at http://www.mofat.go.
kr/consul/overseascitizen/compatriotcondition/index6.jsp?TabMenuTabMenu6, last accessed on April 7, 2011.
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Immigration Service).5 Among them, 376,563 were labeled ethnic Korean Chinese, and
179,954 were other Chinese. Vietnam (84,763), Japan (51,763), the Philippines (46,894)
and Thailand (45,198) followed as the top migrant sending countries. Excluding those
who came for tourism or short business trips, the top visa categories held by foreigners
were “residential” designated for those who married Korean nationals, “industrial
trainees,” as in Japan, those who arrived mostly as labor supply to small and medium
Korean ﬁrms that were experiencing labor shortages, and students. Therefore, the
major patterns of migration into Korea are through international marriage, labor
import, and international education. It is important to note that international marriage
has become a main channel of immigration since the late 1990s. A low fertility regime
and gender selection have caused rural Korea to have one of the highest gender
imbalances in the world. Korean women leave villages for cities. Men in rural villages
are left without marriage partners. Women from Southeast Asian countries are there-
fore brought in to ﬁll the void.
With its native population at 1.3 billion, most regions in China do not see any
foreigners except for tourists. However, long-term foreign residents of di#erent ethnic-
ities and nationalities are part of the ethno-scape of big cities such as Shanghai, Beijing
and Guangzhou. A traditional labor export country, China is now drafting its very ﬁrst
immigration law to deal with the border control pressure from the Southwest to
Northeast.6 According to China’s Ministry of Public Security, about 2.85 million people,
or more than 10 percent of the 26 million foreigners who entered China in 2007, came
for employment. Of the nearly 539,000 foreigners who lived in China for more than six
months, more than half were workers at joint ventures and solely foreign-owned
companies or were family members of such employees. Although overall ﬁgures have
yet to be updated, local statistics have projected a trend of more foreigners staying in
China for longer periods. In December 2007, China’s largest city, Shanghai, announced
a foreign population of 152,000 people, a 14 percent increase from the year before. In
Beijing, the number was 110,000 in 2008, while in southern Guangdong, where an
African community is emerging, the foreign population was at nearly 58,000 in the ﬁrst
half of 2009. China’s 2010 population census, for the ﬁrst time, surveyed foreign
residents in an e#ort to give experts and policy-makers more data on immigration
trends.7 It is worth noting that the Japanese community is the single biggest foreign
community in Shanghai. In fact, Shanghai has surpassed Los Angeles to be the home of
the largest Japanese expat community.
Religion and Migration: the Case of the Chinese Catholic Center in Japan
Voluntary international migration, in most cases, is driven by economic motiva-
tions. People take the journey for the promise of a better life for themselves and their
families. Studies in the migration from Latin America to the US have shown that
5 Statistics are obtained from Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, available at http://www.immigration.go.kr/HP/IMM/
newsimg/statistics/statistics2008.pdf, last accessed on April 7, 2011.
6 China plans draft immigration law,” available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-05/22/content9881622.
htm, last accessed on April 7, 2011.
7 Ibid.
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religion inﬂuences the whole migration process, from decision making, preparing for the
journey, to settlement and incorporation (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). The spiritual
support of religious faith and the physical and social network resources provided by
religious communities in both sending and receiving countries are crucial for the
success of the migratory act as well as adapting to the new socioeconomic environment
in the host country.
There is scarcely any research that has examined the role of religion in the process
of migration in East Asia. During ﬁeldwork among immigrants in Japan, I observe that
among the religious believers, such as Catholics and Buddhists, their religious faith
provides them psychological support. Indeed, some undocumented Chinese Catholics I
encountered in the immigrant congregation in Tokyo prayed before they took the
journey. Many carried amulets for protection. More substantially, my ﬁeldwork in the
immigrant churches and existing literature indicate that in the actual migration
process, the role of religion is most pronounced in the following aspects. First, the
overlapping migration and religious networks, as well as the nature of immigrant life,
tend to turn religious congregations into ethnic community centers and social services
providers. Second, migration makes religion more salient in immigrants’ lives. Mi-
grants tend to have impact on their home region’s religious practices by bringing in
newly acquired religious knowledge, and channeling in religious resources by helping
build transnational religious networks.
The Overlapping Religious and Migration Networks
Social networks perpetuate migration (Massey et al. 1993, 1994). Social networks
also a#ect the demographic makeup and functions of religious congregations in the
migrants’ host society (Liu Farrer 2006). In this section, I introduce a Chinese immi-
grant Catholic congregation in Japan that consisted of mostly undocumented immi-
grants from Fujian Province. Although a single case could not possibly explain
variations, by explaining how, over time, the only Chinese immigrant Catholic congre-
gation in Japan transformed into a largely regional one and became embedded in
kinship-based transnational migration networks, and how this consequently a#ected
the balance of di#erent dimensions of its congregational characteristics and its transna-
tional practices, I argue that congregationalism is constrained by political and social
environments in both host and sending countries as much as by the immigrant commu-
nity’s social and cultural characteristics.
The Chinese Catholic Center
In 1984, a Japanese nun and a student from Taiwan approached a Jesuit priest who
was then teaching at a university and asked him to hold a mass for Chinese-speaking
Catholics in Tokyo. A monthly mass thereafter began in the University Chapel. Since
he did not speak Chinese, the priest gave the sermon in Japanese and a student
translated it into Chinese. About 50 students and Chinese-speaking Catholics from
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan attended the mass. In 1990, through the Provincial
Superior of the Society of Jesus in China, a French priest who spoke ﬂuent Chinese and
had taught and lived in China was assigned to lead the congregation. The congregation
was given an unoccupied Jesuit dormitory by the Society of Jesus in Japan. The new
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pastor and congregation members renovated the seventy-year-old house and started a
weekly Chinese mass in the fall of 1990. The Chinese Catholic Center was o$cially
established. It was supported by the Society of Jesus Japan Province initially.
The Jesuit house had a chapel, o$ce space, a common room, and a kitchen. It soon
became a community center for Chinese immigrants. Members brought in friends and
relatives. On Sundays, over 100 Chinese immigrants ﬁlled the house. After the worship,
they lingered and confabulated. Volunteers cooked lunch. Everybody ate together.
However, after the Kobe earthquake in 1995 the house was inspected and deemed to be
unsafe. The center was told to evacuate the house before 2001. In the meanwhile, the
French pastor also left Japan to take up a new post. The incoming leaders made a lot of
e#ort in locating a new place for the congregation. With the support of the pastor of a
Japanese parish and the Archdiocese of Tokyo, the Chinese Catholic Center moved into
a Japanese parish church in 2001. On Sundays, a Japanese mass was held in the
morning and a Chinese one in the afternoon. About 40 to 50 Chinese congregation
members would stay on for tea and snacks after the worship. Children and youngsters
set up a ping-pong table to play ping-pong. Several people watched TV, although most
gathered around several round tables chatting, munching on snacks, or playing cards
and Chinese chess.
Since moving into the Japanese parish, the congregation had more interaction with
Japanese Catholics. It started issuing the Japanese version of a quarterly newsletter
that used to be in Chinese only. Japanese people from the parish were also invited to
participate in many center events, such as Chinese New Year celebrations and the
center’s anniversary celebrations. The Chinese congregation also took part in activities
organized by Catholic parishes in that area. Although a few members from the Jesuit
house era were nostalgic about the old exclusive environment and described the old
place as resembling home more, most others liked the new place because it was spacious
and they had more social interaction with Catholic Japanese. In any event, more and
more members in the congregation came after it was relocated, and the Jesuit house
became a center legend.
Creating a regional congregation
Starting with members from various regions in China and some core members from
Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Chinese Catholic Center gradually became a predominantly
Fujian immigrant congregation. By 2003, 90 percent of the congregants were from
Fujian, most of them undocumented (See Table 2). The presence of a large number of
Catholic Fujian immigrants in Japan provided the demographic base for the Chinese
Catholic congregation in Tokyo to consist of members mostly from Fujian Province.
Fujian, particularly rural areas around the capital city, Fuzhou, not only had one of the
largest Catholic populations in China but also sent one of the largest migrant popula-
tions to Japan. Although around 210,000 Roman Catholics worshiped in registered
churches in Fujian,8 there were numerous underground churches in the province.9
8 This number comes from the Overseas Missionary Fellowship. “China Church Survey,” by Tony Lambert. Global
Chinese Ministries NewsletterMarch 2003, available at http://www.us.omf.org/content.asp?id-17570, last accessed on
July 8, 2006.
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Journalistic and academic reports often estimated China’s Catholics to be three to four
times of the o$cial number (Madsen 2003). According to such a calculation, Catholics
in Fujian were likely to approach a million. Some informants told me that in their home
villages, every Sunday, at least several hundred people attended mass. In 2005, Ash
Wednesday coincided with Chinese New Year. One center member learnt from his wife
at home that over three thousand people congregated at their local parish.
Since the late 1980s, immigrants from areas surrounding Fuzhou started migrating
into Japan. Fujian has consistently ranked among the top ﬁve among the sending
regions of legal immigrants to Japan, together with three Northeast provinces and
Shanghai. However, the number of undocumented Fujian immigrants was likely to be
as high or higher. The Japan Coast Guard discovered organized human smuggling from
China in 1990 for the ﬁrst time. Since then, 80 percent of apprehended illegal entrants
into Japan were Chinese, and almost all were from Fujian.10 Since the mid-1990s, the
number of apprehended clandestine entrants from China was over one thousand every
year. In my own survey among the Chinese immigrants in Japan, more than half of the
Fujian immigrants who answered the question on legal statuses reported to be undocu-
mented (Table 2). Many Fujian immigrants, including one sister from the center,
believed there were likely over 100,000 Fujian immigrants in Japan, with or without
legal statuses.
As important as the numbers of Catholics in Fujian and immigrants from that area
was the conjunction of the kinship-based networks that were used for both interna-
tional migration and religious activities. Fujian immigrants mostly came from rural
areas around the capital city, Fuzhou (Liang and Ye 1999; Liang and Morooka 2004).
The villages in these areas were naturally formed by and named after one or two
extended families. For example, most people living in Chen-Li Village belong to either
the Chen family or the Li family. Similar to rural migrants out of Mexico to the US
(Massey et al, 1987), Fujian immigrants mostly migrated through kinship-based net-
works. As a result, neighboring villages often varied greatly in the number of emigrants
and the destinations of migration. This was not only true to clandestine migrants
whose illicitness required a high degree of mutual trust only attainable through closed
social networks (Coleman 1990), but also applied to legal migrants who came to Japan
on student visas. Because of the general ignorance of application procedures, the legally
entered Fujian informants I interviewed mostly arranged their migration into Japan
through “snakeheads11” by paying a substantial fee (Liu-Farrer 2008). Very often these
“snakeheads” were in their extended families or connected to their extended families.
On the other hand, the Chinese Catholic community in general mostly developed
through kinship networks (Madsen 1998, 2003). Members of the Chinese Catholic
Center were either from families with generations of Catholics or were initiated into
Catholicism through kin. According to my informants, during the 1980s and 1990s in
9 Because of the Chinese Communist Party’s e#orts to bar foreign inﬂuences over Chinese Christians, in contemporary
China, Chinese Catholics were channeled into two competing organizationsthe open church that belonged to the
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association independent from the ecclesiastical authority of the Holy See and the under-
ground church clustered around priests ordained by and loyal to the Vatican (Liu and Leung 2002; Madsen 2003).
10 Data is obtained from http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhoushi/kouhoushi3.htm, last accessed on Dec. 20, 2005.
11 Snakeheads is a name they used for all brokers and middle agencies in the migration industry.
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the villages of coastal Fujian, the number of Catholics increased rapidly because of the
evangelizing e#orts of neighbors and villagers. Since the majority belonged to non-
o$cial churches, they also relied on these networks to inform members of schedule
changes and other church events. Through frequent communications between immi-
grants in Japan and their families at home and the growing former center members in
their local parishes (a point I will elaborate later), the Chinese Catholic Center became
known among Fujian Catholics in China. Many congregation members were aware of
the existence of such a Catholic organization before they came to Japan. Among those
who did not know about the center initially, after arriving in Japan and getting
connected to the kin and friends here, they would soon ﬁnd it.
As a consequence of the size of the Catholic population among Fujian immigrants
and their kinship-based transnational migration networks and religious connections,
the Chinese Catholic Center soon became a congregation consisting of an increasing
number of Fujian immigrants. In 2003, when the church survey was administered,
Fujian immigrants composed 90 percent of the congregation12 (Table 2). With the
increase of Fujian immigrants, it also became an important node in their transnational
migration networks, which brought more and more immigrants from that region into
the congregation.
Immigrant churches and community center functions
Although immigrants migrate mostly for secular, particularly economic reasons,
religion increases salience when they become immigrants (Warners 1993). The sense of
marginality in the unfamiliar socio-cultural environment of the host society, the trauma
of status loss accompanying the downward mobility often inevitable in the migration
process, and the hardship of labor and the loneliness of feelings tend to push immigrants
into religion, particularly their own ethnic congregations (Greeley 1972, Hurh 1998). As
Ebaugh and Chafez (2000) pointed out, “immigrants are attracted to speciﬁcally immi-
grant religious institutions in large measure because they seek to develop social
networks with others who share their native language, customs, experiences, and
problems.” As a result, immigrants establish religious congregations for themselves.
These religious congregations are organizations where they seek economic and social
12 80 people (including myself) responded to the church survey conducted in October 2003. 33 people answered “China” to
the question “birthplace.” 47 people wrote down cities or provinces. Among the 47, 41 marked “Fujian.” When asked
about how they ﬁlled out the answers later, several Fujian members said they wrote down “China.” Given my
observation that Fujian immigrants were sometimes reluctant to report their regional origin in social occasions and quite
a few changed their birthplaces to other provinces in their fake passports and alien registration cards, I suspect most of
these “Chinese people” were in fact from Fujian. I therefore could safely say the percentage was close to 90 by imputing
the numbers.
Table 2. Region and sex compositions of the Chinese Catholic Center (2003)
Fujian Non-Fujian Missing2 Total
Men 17 1 9 27
Women 24 5 22 51
Total 41 6 31 78
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resources, social support, status recognition and feeling of home (Hurh 1997, Liu Farrer
2006). In the case of the Chinese Catholic Center in Japan, the concentration of Fujian
immigrants has paradoxical e#ects. On the one hand, it created an ethnic community
and resource center for the Fujian immigrants, especially the undocumented migrants
who were in much more urgent need of socioeconomic support. On the other hand,
concentration of Fujianese created social, cultural and linguistic barriers for incorporat-
ing Chinese Catholics from elsewhere.13
Due largely to sensational media coverage of organized human smuggling from
Fujian to Japan, Fujian Province was frequently associated with organized crime, and
Fujian people with illegal immigrants. In addition, Fujian immigrants, compared to
immigrants from other regions in China, were less educated and predominantly from
rural areas (Liang and Morooka 2004). These social and economic characteristics
created their underclass image. Fujian immigrants thus became isolated in the Chinese
immigrant community in Japan. In my ﬁeldwork with Chinese social dance in Tokyo,
rare occasions where people from di#erent regional and socioeconomic backgrounds
intersected, I constantly heard discriminatory remarks toward the Fujian immigrants
and clearly sensed an avoidance of their company. There was a clear separation of
Fujian people from the others (Liu Farrer 2004). The Catholic Center was a rare public
space where the Fujian immigrants did not feel discriminated against inside.
While Fujian immigrants cherished the fellowship at the center because they
shared the same language, customs, and problems from being migrant laborers and
victims of social prejudice, the Chinese immigrants from elsewhere sometimes felt
marginalized in the environment. Fujian dialects were incomprehensible to other
Chinese immigrants. Their relative lack of socioeconomic diversity also made the
congregation unable to match the interests of Chinese from other regions who were
mostly legal and more socially mobile. Other Chinese also depended less on the
resources provided by the center because they were more likely to be a$liated with
formal organizations and had alternative institutional resources. As a consequence, the
Chinese Catholic Center saw fewer and fewer Chinese from elsewhere. I had met
non-Fujian immigrants in the center who found the place through its webpage, but they
left after several weeks. Those who remained were either connected to the congregation
through immediate family such as spouses or kin, or because they had no alternative.
The center had been the only place in Japan that Chinese mass was given.14 Non-Fujian
Chinese who could not speak Japanese continued to participate in the congregation,
although they rarely stayed to socialize after the worship.
The concentration of Fujian immigrants in the only Chinese speaking Catholic
congregation in Japan a#ected its institutional characteristics in important ways.
Measured by Ebaugh and Chafetz’s two dimensions typical of congregational organiza-
tion, the Chinese Catholic Center had a weak congregational structure and a strong
community center feature (Liu Farrer 2006). In particular, it assumes an important
function as resource providers.
13 Ambrose (2006) observed the same phenomenon in the Taiwanese protestant congregations in Tokyo.
14 In January 2005, another Chinese mass began in Saitama Prefecture.
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1) The Community center: home away from home
Ebaugh and Chafez (2000) deﬁne the community center as a place that includes the
communal celebration of secular holidays, secular classes, mundane services for mem-
bers, recreational facilities and a community hall in which social activities occur.
Although the Chinese Catholic Center in Tokyo was foremost a religious institution that
provided guidance to immigrants’ faith life and administered sacraments, it adopted
many community center functions.
Because the center occupied an independent building during the ﬁrst 12 years, its
physical detachment from other Japanese institutions impressed on the congregation
members a sense of social detachment from Japanese society. It helped the Fujian
immigrants feel secure inside. As some members put it, “when you closed the door, it
became our own world. We always spent the whole day in the center. The atmosphere
was good. People greeted you when you walked in. We really felt at home there.”
The center celebrated secular holidays such as the Chinese New Year. It had a
common room where members could gather and socialize. Sometimes wedding recep-
tions were held there. In late 2004, two newcomers from Hong Kong started o#ering
English classes to the members. The center also provided limited recreational facilities
such as a ping-pong table, a small library, cards and chess, and organized retreats during
New Year holidays. Most importantly, the congregation provided social networks that
were an essential resource for Fujian immigrants.
2) Resource providers
The biggest practical problems Fujian immigrants faced were housing and jobs.
Undocumented immigrants had di$culties in ﬁnding housing because in Japan a
guarantor was usually needed for leasing apartments. Fujian immigrants relied on
social networks to solve housing problem. Most of them lived with kin or friends.
However, their kin and friends were also frequently undocumented immigrants, and
sometimes repatriated unexpectedly. The initial connection between the owner and the
tenant could suddenly disappear. The roommates therefore had to ﬁnd new housing.
Occasionally, the roommates feared the police would raid their apartment after one
person was arrested for illegal stay and opted to leave. The Chinese Catholic Center
extended Fujian immigrants’ social networks. Not only did many members end up
sharing apartments, when emergencies occurred, they had more alternative places to go.
Because most Fujian immigrants came to Japan with the sole purpose to make
money, and often came with heavy initial ﬁnancial burdens, they not only needed jobs
immediately upon arrival, but also changed jobs often in order to get better pay.
Lacking language proﬁciency and frequently, proper documents, the majority of Fujian
immigrants relied on relatives and friends’ introductions and references for jobs. In the
stagnating Japanese economy, good jobs were di$cult to ﬁnd. Because of the mass
media’s portraits of crimes committed by foreigners, not only did the undocumented
immigrants but the legal ones also have trouble ﬁnding jobs. Networks therefore were
essential for Fujian immigrants. According to my independent survey, over four-ﬁfths
of employed Fujian immigrants found their current jobs through kin and friends. The
Chinese congregation, with a majority working part-time jobs in restaurants, food
markets, and construction, was a good source for job information. Moreover, outside of
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the church, job introductions cost money even among friends and relatives. Within the
church, however, my interviewees claimed that members gave information about jobs
for free. Several interviewees reported to have found jobs through people at the
congregation.
These types of social resources available through the center were especially impor-
tant for immigrants who had limited kinship networks in Japan or could not rely on
them for assistance. Yimin, a young man I interviewed, was the ﬁrst in his village to
come to Japan. Typical of Fujian immigrants, he came with a debt of three million yen
(about USD 26,000). After two years in a language school in Okinawa, he enrolled in a
post-secondary vocational school in Tokyo. Without kin in Tokyo and knowing few
people, he was out of a job for four months. He quit school and gave up his student dorm
because he could not a#ord the tuition or the rent. His mother, through a church
member in the local village, obtained the address of the congregation in Tokyo. When
he ﬁnally knocked on the door of the center, he was homeless, living o# a slice of bread
everyday. He moved in with a center member and was introduced to jobs. Initially
intending to pursue college education in Japan, Yimin regretted that he gave up the
opportunity because he found the congregation too late. “If he had found the church
earlier, we would all have helped him.” One Center member told me, “We could at least
loan him money to pay for the tuition.”
In addition to network resources, because of the vulnerable political and social
situations they found themselves in, the undocumented Fujian Catholic immigrants or
their families turned to the center for social support and practical services they had
trouble obtaining from other channels. Catholicism had a history of benevolence and
assistance to people in disadvantaged situations (Degene#e 2003). In practice, the
Chinese Catholic Center was in close cooperation with the Catholic Tokyo International
Center, which was founded and administered by the Archdiocese of Tokyo for migrant
workers and foreigners staying in Japan. Since its establishment, the sisters of the
Chinese congregation took upon themselves the task of visiting detained undocu-
mented immigrants, helped communicate their needs to their families and friends and
delivered goods. Several times they had to negotiate with the police in order to expedite
the repatriating process for some congregation members in order to unite them with
their families in di$culty. Furthermore, for undocumented immigrants, the center was
the only place that gave o$cial recognition to their marriage. Several informants of
mine received the sacrament of matrimony and had wedding ceremonies at the center.
Over the years, the Chinese Catholic Center gained publicity by sheltering an immigrant
with a lethal injury. It was also known for raising funds to send another undocumented
immigrant who was seriously ill back home. Both immigrants were from Fujian.
3) Religious resources a#ecting incorporation patterns
Although the Chinese Catholic Center had a large share of undocumented migrants
and provides important social resources to this vulnerable migrant group, by providing
alternative resources, it helps documented migrants stay legal. The Catholic Center is
a part of an extensive formal organization and possessing resources and networks of its
own, without discriminating against undocumented migrants, it exercises to help
resource-poor legal Fujian immigrants access mainstream Japanese society.
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Liu-Farrer (2008) describes the negative e#ects of social networks on Fujian immi-
grants, pointing out that the social networks, a majority of which were made up of
undocumented migrants, contributed to visa overstaying among Fujian students. The
ones that could avoid such network e#ects were those who participated in other social
organizations and obtained alternative resources for e#ective adaptation in Japan. One
such organization was church. Although the two Chinese religious congregations I
participated in tended to have a concentration of Fujian immigrants, they were still able
to provide resources conducive to retaining legal statuses and social mobility. In the
Catholic congregation, although ninety percent of the congregants were Fujian immi-
grants and most were undocumented, there were also a couple of graduate students,
several college students, two software engineers, several employees and self-employed
business people that brought in information and possible connections. The clergy also
helped students ﬁnd schools and jobs. Yiling, whose father had been in Japan on an
employment visa, was brought to Japan at the age of 17 as a dependent to earn more
income for the family. The pastor and the sisters at the church helped her enroll in a
junior college despite her father’s objection. Her student status saved her from deporta-
tion when her father was found to be a visa-abuser. Also through church ties, she found
employment at a kindergarten and ﬁnally obtained a work visa.
Transnational Religious Practices
In recent years, scholars have paid increasing attention to immigrants’ transna-
tional religious practices. Transnationality was considered an important institutional
characteristic of immigrant congregations. For example, Yang (2002) describes three-
layered trans-Paciﬁc networks formed by contacts between individuals, single churches,
and para-Chinese Christian Churches that connected migrants in Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Mainland China to their counterparts in the U.S. and Canada. The Chinese Catholic
Center’s transnational practices also took on distinct characteristics because of the
political and social situations of its members.
The Chinese Catholic Center, in comparison with the immigrant religious institu-
tions being studied in US, had limited transnational practices. This was ﬁrst because of
the Chinese government’s ban on foreign missionary work in China and the political
sensitivity of the underground church where most Chinese congregants belonged. The
center refrained from direct contact with immigrants’ home organizations for fear it
would potentially endanger the Catholics and their religious institutions in immigrants’
hometowns. Secondly, the majority of its members were undocumented and therefore
were not free to travel transnationally. This limited the resource exchanges between
the center and the churches in immigrants’ home villages.
Despite the di$culties, the center a#ected the religious institution in immigrants’
home society through an expanding network of alumni reeducated in the Catholic
doctrine and practices, and impressed with a vision of the world church and a sense of
connection with a global Chinese Catholic organization.
Due to social isolation, the immigrants from rural Fujian had very limited knowl-
edge of the Catholic faith. In the Catholic Center in Japan, the members participated in
courses of Catholic doctrine and practices. I heard many immigrants comment that they
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had never truly understood their faith until joining the center. The center also tried to
develop among its members a reconciliatory attitude toward the o$cial churches in
Mainland China. Some researchers pointed out that the membership of the open and
the underground churches overlapped and the boundary blurred in some areas (Lozada
2001; Liu and Leung 2002). However, in rural Fujian, the tension between the under-
ground church and the o$cial church seemed to be more heightened. Almost all Fujian
immigrants in the Catholic congregation in Japan were a$liated with underground
churches at home. After joining the Chinese Catholic Center, however, immigrants
learnt to neglect the distinction between the open and the underground because several
members from other regions in China were a$liated with o$cial churches. The center
also tried to give its members perspectives about the conﬂict. Priests from other
overseas Chinese churches were invited to give lectures on Chinese church a#airs.
The high member turnover at the center meant an increasing alumni population in
China. Many former members were active in their local congregations after they went
back home. Some organized youth leagues in their communities. Two of the ﬁve people
I interviewed in Fujian assumed administrative roles in their local congregations. One
middle-aged woman said she did not have to work for a living after returning from
Japan. Coordinating with other members and organizing masses became her job.
Although the Catholic Church was organized around the clergy and therefore the
priests and sisters had more authority about religious matters, the former members
tried to communicate to their religious communities what they had learned about the
Catholic doctrine and practices in Japan. It would be di$cult to assess the inﬂuence
their education in Japan had on their home community, but the former members were
expected to bring fresh air to the relatively isolated and conservative Catholic Church
in rural China.
The center’s nodal position in immigrants’ transnational kin networks and its
expanding alumni network also allowed the center to channel some educational re-
sources into the congregations in immigrants’ home villages. Three hundred former
members left their contact information with the center, and received a quarterly
newsletter. The members also sent home newsletters and other religious materials. The
priests and the sisters visited members’ families or former members in China every year.
They took with them videos of the Chinese Center’s activities, which included their
family members in Japan, and other materials to distribute among them. When I visited
Fujian in August 2003, the former pastor of the center had just left the Fuzhou area.
About 40 Fujian alumni went to meet the priest, some ﬂying over from other parts of
China just for the occasion. Upon their requests, the clergy also o#ered lectures on
doctrine to the local Catholic communities, and occasionally led worship services.
However, because of their political sensitivity, these kinds of religious practices were
infrequent.
Conclusion and Future Research Directions
The statistical data on religion and migration in Japan, China and Korea is scarce.
Very little research has been done on this topic. As a result, this paper is largely based
on my ethnographic study in a Chinese immigrant Catholic congregation in Japan. The
patterns of the relationships between migration and religion are suggestive based on
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this case study. First, it shows that both migration and religion rely heavily on social
network ties, and these social ties often both facilitate migration as well as spread
religious beliefs. Upon migration, such overlapping migration and religious networks
a#ect the congregational structure of the immigrant churches. In many cases, similar to
those in US immigrant communities, Chinese immigrant churches in Japan assume a
weak congregational structure but strong community center functioning. The nature of
immigrant life tends to turn religious congregations into ethnic community centers and
social services providers. Second, migration makes religion more salient in immigrants’
lives. Migrants tend to impact their home region’s religious practices by bringing in
newly acquired religious knowledge, and channeling in religious resources by helping
build transnational religious networks.
Given the rapid expansion of both religion and migration in East Asian countries,
much more e#ort is needed in order to produce more reliable and extensive data about
the religious practices among the immigrants in this region and the relationship
between religion and migration. What are the roles that religion plays in the migration
process? What are the roles of migration in spreading, reducing or transforming
religion? Aside from improving the data situation in general, the following issue areas
beg attention.
1) Churches and the border-crossing of North Korean refugees
North Korea is one country this paper does not even mention. Due to draconian
political control and total collapse of economic life, people ﬂee North Korea in droves
and often enter Chinese borders ﬁrst before heading toward South Korea. There are a
few reports on how Korean Christian churches are helping out these refugees. They are
not only providing shelters but also actively involved in their migratory acts. However,
no substantial research has been done.
2) The growing Chinese Christian population and their missionary activities
Chin-Kwang Chen (2006) has observed that the Chinese Christian communities are
growing rapidly both in China and overseas. The conversion rate in China and among
overseas Mainland Chinese is very high. Increasing numbers of Chinese congregations,
mainly for Mainland Chinese, are established in not only traditionally immigrant and
Christian countries, but also in countries such as Mongolia, most nations of the former
Soviet Republic, most Eastern European countries and many Polynesian nations. The
migration of Chinese Christian merchants, typically those from the Wenzhou region,
has taken Christianity into territories that are dominated by non-Christian religions,
such as the Middle East. Mostly congregating to worship in their local languages, these
merchants sometimes also convert locals. Finally, with the expanding Christian com-
munity, the Back to Jerusalem movement is being revived in China.
3) The Uyghurs migrants?Economic migrants, religious migrants or political migrants
The Uyghurs are an important group of immigrants in Japan. Very little research
has been done about this group. A Uyghur migrant community has been formed in
Japan. A Japanese branch of the World Uyghur Congress was established. However,
Uyghur migrants are not considered as religious or political refugees. Uyghur migra-
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tion into Japan shares the same pattern as other Chinese. They often arrive as language
students, enter educational institutions and then go on to become employees. Accord-
ing to the American Consulate in Japan, they also have a higher visa-overstay rate than
other Chinese who apply to visit the U. S. However, Uyghurs are frequently Muslims.
How their religion has a#ected their migration experience and how their international
migration has inﬂuenced their religious practices are potentially fruitful areas of
inquiry.
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